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Abstract 
The inclusion of a shareholder voting trust system in China is an important, yet absent, feature of modern corporate 
sector. Despite its necessity, it seems that no proper notice of its nonexistence has been taken in the past nor has 
any attention been paid to this particular area in previous decades. Since China lies among the top corporate players 
of the world, there is a need for increased trust from the general public to invest in the current corporate sector. It 
is the position of this paper that the most practicable way of achieving this goal is to introduce a shareholder voting 
trust system. Therefore, this paper shall focus on all the advantages that voting trust systems have provided in the 
corporate world and how similar systems could potentially be introduced into the Chinese corporate system.  
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1. Introduction 
A shareholder voting trust is a device which is used to transfer voting rights from one person to another. The other 
person, known as a trustee, can thereby attend shareholders’ meetings and becomes eligible to vote in relation to 
the trust which has created through execution of an agreement with two or more shareholders.1 The voting trust 
system is very necessary for the purpose of securing confidence of shareholders in the corporation. The main and 
foremost reason for the adoption of a voting trust agreement is the ease through which shareholders can resolve 
their issues – just by transferring their shares to a blind trustee, the probability of avoiding confrontation increases. 
At the same time, a voting trust can also benefit a corporation through its use to prevent any hostile take-over 
maneuvers. Hence, whenever the shareholders sense the smell of invasion, the shareholders could band together 
to create a block through which the possibility of such takeover could be curtailed.2  
Additionally, voting trusts help coax an otherwise timid general public in participating in investment 
economy. The fiduciary duty of a trustee to a shareholder and standards in place for the execution of a voting trust 
agreement help bolster faith in corporate governance and allow for even unsophisticated investors to feel that they 
are in good hands.3 Whenever, the voting trust is created in the corporation the trustee is obligated to present a 
voting trust certificate to the shareholders in return for an assurance that it has shifted the control of his/her shares 
in favor of the trustee who shall then on execute powers on his/her behalf in the corporation until the trust 
agreement expires.4 Similarly, the voting trust is beneficial whenever the company is going through the process of 
reorganization due to the reason of financial crises in such scenario the shareholders could also transfer their shares 
in favor of the trustee who could take several actions on their behalf. Likewise, such transfer also assists the 
company in regaining its lost financial momentum. On the other hand, the voting trust system could also be used 
as a helpful device under those conditions where shares are transferred inside the family. Especially in those cases 
where parents opt to transfer shares in favor of a child, the use of a trustee to vote on behalf of the minor can 
protect the child’s interests from any probable intrusion and without requiring the impractical participation of said 
child in shareholder voting.5 This whole discussion clearly illustrates the extraordinary importance of the voting 
trust agreement and the protection voting trusts provide to shareholder rights. 
 
1.1. Historical Background of voting trust 
The voting trust was initially adopted by the USA and this gave birth to the first ever statue of voting trust which 
was embraced by the New York state in 1901. within the span of next seven years it was then espoused by the state 
of Maryland in 1908. After the gap of almost seventeen years the state of California emerged as the third state to 
 
1 See J. Gordon Gose, “Legal Characteristics and Consequences of Voting Trusts”, 20:3 WASH. L. REV. 129, 129 (1945). 
2  See “What is a Voting Trust”, Corporate Finance Institute, (2015) available at 
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/deals/voting-trust/. 
3 See Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, “Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy”, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503, 1526-28 (2006) 
(noting that individual shareholders lost confidence in the system when there was no mechanism by which a small investor could have a 
‘meaningful voice’ in a corporation); see also John W. Giles, “Is the Voting Trust Agreement a "Dangerous Instrumentality"?”, 3 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 81, 85 (1953) (quoting Coleman Burke and his favorable views on voting trusts for the reason that they are “normally beneficial to all 
concerned”). 
4 See Gose, supra n.1 at 138. 
5 Corporate Finance Institute, supra n. 2. 
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adopt voting trust in 1919.1 Initially, its usage was kept quite restricted in the state of California and it’s usage was 
only allowed to the corporations for the purpose of marketing of agricultural products. However, within following 
years this system was embraced by several new states such as : Delaware, Florida, Nevada, Ohio, Arkansans, New 
Jersey and Louisiana.2 With that being the case slowly and gradually this newly introduced system was adopted 
by numerous other states one after another. However, when we go back in the pages of history then it could be 
observed that primarily, there were five main historical statues from which this whole system has been evolved 
over the past century3. which includes: New York, Delaware, and Ohio. Initially, those were the three main states 
which introduced voting trusts into the corporate world besides two other model acts.4 Likewise, There are several 
other corporate systems in the world which have prospered because of the voting trust system or due to a similar 
kind of body with a different name. For instance, in the corporate governance of France there is a system called 
“Syndicats-de-Blocage” under which the voting rights are transferred to the heads of syndicates/organizations who 
act and vote on behalf of all the shareholders.5 In the meantime this system is flourishing in some other European 
countries like Italy where this system has been propelling over the years and it has provided a way for both the 
shareholders and management to protect themselves from any unwarranted incidents like take over and other 
aggressive maneuver’s towards corporation. It was discovered that, the one third of the major business in the Italian 
listed companies has been run by the large number of shareholders jointly through “Patti di Sindacato” which is 
the Italian term for voting trust and not only that these agreements were  made public through national newspaper 
which publishes all the details of such agreements including the term of expiry which  were also transmitted to the 
(Italian security and exchange authority).6 The evidences further suggest that voting trust has contributed in 
increasing the efficiency of governance there are significant proofs which reflects how it has increased the 
executive benefits and firm value in the Italian corporations. If for instance the firms faced with 10% decline in 
the profit’s, then the executive income probably surges up to 7% if the same was being controlled through the 
voting trust system. On the contrary, it also suggests that the firm value is likely to be ranged between 14 to 40 
percent when the firm is controlled through the voting trust.7 Moreover, many other countries – such as Canada 
and the Philippines 8  - have also acknowledged the legitimacy of shareholder voting trusts by allowing for 
shareholder trust agreements. Similarly, finally, Japan has also implemented a voting trust system that triggers 
specifically in hostile takeover situations.9 
 
1.2. The benefits of voting trust agreement 
The voting trust is an instrument through which control of a corporation can be devised. For a better understanding, 
we can say that the voting trust entails the trustee with power to exercise the legal right as owner of shares through 
a voting trust agreement and in return, the shareholders becomes legally entitled to receive benefits such as 
dividends as  beneficial owner.10 Likewise, the voting trust agreement is as much beneficial for the companies as 
it is for shareholders. Specifically, in situations where the company is going through the business expansion 
process  and it invites new investors,  the company’s major holders normally offer a voting trust agreement so that 
the interest of newly entered investors can be safeguarded as the entirety of voting rights are transferred into the 
hands of an impartial trustee.11 This type of agreement is equally beneficial for both the majority and minority 
shareholders because while this device secures the interest of majority shareholders from each other, it naturally 
protects the interest of minority shareholders from the majority shareholders simultaneously. Therefore,  the 
ultimate goal of  company – which is normally to make business decisions that result in  huge profits – is easily 
achieved through the help of voting trust.12 Furthermore, voting trust agreements are also profitable for creditors 
as the agreements help the creditors to secure their interest when a corporation is not doing well, specifically, under 
circumstances when it appears obvious that the company is on the verge of becoming insolvent.13 Under those 
 
1  See Thomas W Watkins, “The Development of Voting Trust Legislation”, 35 U. DET. L. J. 595, 600 (1958) available at 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/udetmr35&div=45&id=&page=. 
2 Ibid. 
3 See Id. (citing California is the only state whose statute cannot be traced to some other model. See CAL. COP. CODE §§ 2230-31 (1955). 
4 See Id. (citing The text of these laws and models appears in Appendices A-1 to A-5. 
5 See Carl Martin Ross, “Comparative Note on Shareholders Voting Agreement”, 15 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW, 163-190 (1971) available 
at https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.intyb/svnsl0015&id=163&collection=intyb&index=. 
6 See Gianfranco Gianfrate What Do Shareholders Coalition Really Want? Evidence From Italian Voting Trusts (2007) Corporate Governance 
An: International Review V.15 Iss.2 pp.122-132 available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00549.x.  
7 See ibid (citing Volpin (2002). 
8 See Section 59 of the Corporation Code of The Philippines provides for the establishment of a voting trust agreement not exceeding five years 
duration. 
9  See “Trust-Type Rights Plan”, Trust Companies Association of Japan (2020) available at https://www.shintaku-
kyokai.or.jp/en/trusts/trusts03_14_10.html. 
10  See Maurice Finkelstein, Voting Trust Agreements, 24 MICH. L. REV. 344 (1926) available at 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/mlr24&id=373&men_tab=srchresults#. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
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situations the creditors often use the voting trust agreement to re-establish the business of the company.1 Hence, 
under such conditions what the voting trust  does is it provides a way for the trustees to “block the stock”  and in 
some occasions it gives the entire control of the corporation to the trustees in return for the trustees provision of 
sound management resulting in long term benefits for the whole corporation.2 There are scores of cases in the past 
where courts are found praising this new, more efficient management for the corporation.3 Therefore, due to the 
existence of the voting trust,  the company’s shareholders and other related entities are fully assured that their stake 
is in the safe hands of competent management which will take good care of their corporation – and investment – 
and simultaneously, a safer way for creditors to lend money to the corporation is also provided. Thus, the voting 
trust agreement is an important device for raising funds, buying property, and for achieving other important 
developments for the corporation. A similar kind of voting trust was executed between the Trans World Airlines 
and Hughes Tool Company in United States under which the Hughes Tool Company supported the financing of 
Trans World Airlines by allowing the board seats to the creditors.4 Under this accord, the stock of Trans World 
Airlines was held by the Hughes Tool Company and the same was put under the hands of three different trustees, 
two trustees belonged to Trans World Airlines and one belonged to Hughes Tool Company.5  The whole agreement 
was based on the condition that the Hughes Tool Company would provide money to the Trans World Airlines so 
that they could buy new Aeroplan’s.6 Thus, Trans World Airlines benefitted from the voting trust agreement by 
gaining capital to expand their business, the shareholders benefitted from the new revenue being brought in by 
such expansion, and the creditors benefitted from expedited return on money lent.7 Besides those mentioned 
benefits, there are some other benefits of voting trust agreements which other agreements like pooling and proxies 
lack since they normally require judicial implementation.Voting trust agreements do not necessarily require 
judicial implementation; Likewise, the father of voting trust device, an esteemed Professor Henry Winthrop 
Ballantine, once said that, the voting trust authorizes the trustee to act as an owner himself which is rather different 
than an agent who merely acts under the command of his principal.8 Similarly, a voting trust agreement can  be 
used when the corporation feels that it should wind up its business. The case of Clowes v. Millers is a perfect 
example of this kind of voting trust agreement.9 In this case, the voting trust was created for the purpose of selling 
stock.10 Likewise, in 1919, the court of New Jersey endorsed a voting trust where it was established to prevent the 
submarine producing corporation – which was building submarines for the English government – from getting into 
the hands of German spies.11 Hence, it would not be wrong to say that voting trust emerged as a device meant to 
maintain corporate control and has historically benefitted corporations from unwanted takeover.12  
 
1.3. Voting trusts importance for the entire corporate sector 
One of the many benefits voting trusts give to corporations and the corporate sector is its ability to curb corporate 
difficulties such as shareholder activism. Shareholder activism has caused many concerns in the corporate sector 
through the creation of conflicts between management resulting in a change in dynamics of the corporations and 
its strategies.13 Shareholder activism has also affected the normal cycle of corporate governance14 and has raised 
many issues including political, social, and environmental .15 This atmosphere has driven the whole corporate 
market towards the pure political system rather than a market-based environment.16 It has further been claimed 
that shareholder activism has taken the entire command of  corporations into its hands and the activists are the 
ones who actually direct the corporations in making important decisions.17 Therefore, it has disrupted the natural 
 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid.  






8  See John J. Woloszyn, "A Practical Guide to Voting Trusts," U. OF BALTIMORE L. REV.: Vol. 4: Iss. 2, Article 4 (1975) available at: 
http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol4/iss2/4. 
9  See Louie M. Horne, Voting Trust Agreements in Indiana, 19 IND. L.J. 225, 226 (1944) available at 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/indana19&id=236&men_tab=srchresults# (citing 60 N.J.Eq. 79, 
47 Atl. 345 (1900). 
10 Ibid. 
11  Ibid (citing Frost v. Carse, 91 N.J.Eq. 124, 108 Atl. 642 (1919). 
12 See ibid; Turner Vann Adams, “Corporations -- Voting Trusts -- Should Trust Principles Apply to Close Corporations?”, 48 N.C. L. REV. 336, 
344 (1970). 
13 See Maria Goranova, Lori Verstegen Ryan Shareholder Activism: A Multidisciplinary Review Journal of Management 2013 available at 
http://jom.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/12/13/0149206313515519  (citing  (David, Bloom, & Hillman, 2007; David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001, 
Song & Szewczyk, 2003; Westphal & Bednar, 2008). 
14 See ibid (citing (Davis & Thompson, 1994; Dimitrov & Jain, 2011). 
15 See ibid (citing (Clark & Crawford, 2012; David et al., 2007; Reid & Toffel, 2009). 
16 See ibid (citing (Karpoff, Malatesta, & Walkling, 1996; Wahal, 1996). 
17 See ibid (citing Duhigg, 2007: C1) 
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balance of power in today’s modern corporate world.1 Shareholder activism has been often termed a controversial 
element of the corporate system as on number of occasions it has caused ambiguity and misguidance as to the 
actual desires of the targeted corporations which ultimately turns into their eventual total ineffectiveness. 2 
Likewise, major shareholders often use several types of activism – for example, exit activism, also known as the 
“Wall Street walk”, a kind of activism under which the majority shareholders threatens the firm to sell shares – for 
personal gains such as modeling a company’s direction towards an avenue most attractive or profitable to them.3 
Due to this very reason, majority shareholders are often found pressurizing corporate management because of  a 
result of their influence over the top management and other stakeholders; whenever the majority shareholder feels 
that corporate direction is going against their will, they can execute the threat of selling shares and walking out of 
the company.4 It is true that, being an active shareholder is good but being an activist could turn out very badly 
especially when activism disrupts the direction of the whole company. It would not be wrong to say that 
shareholder activism is simply a device for power hungry players who intends to oust other shareholders’ interest.5 
In today’s world, shareholder activism is exercised through hedge funds which point out weaker areas of company 
management and after they establish a large stake in the corporation, they put pressure on the management and 
dictate their decisions according to their will. However, under such circumstances voting trust could also be used 
as an important device to overcome the issue of activism as it provides an avenue for shareholders to band together. 
Under such circumstances, any aggressive act or pressuring tactic on part of a majority activist shareholder could 
be “blocked” right away by the rest of the shareholders coming together.6  Thus, it is clear that, every corporation 
should include some form of protective system like a voting trust agreement in its corporate sector through which 
issues like activism and other problems of  like nature could  be curbed.7   
 
2. Introduction of voting trust in China in accordance with the essence of Chinese characteristics 
Just like the law of nature8 it is important that before introducing any new system it should be kept in mind that 
the present characteristics of the law should be maintained at any cost. Similarly, while suggesting the introduction 
of this new system in China, it is necessary to keep in mind that it should not affect the very essence of the law, 
meaning the characteristics of the law.9 The main characteristics of the Chinese corporate law is derived from the 
Company Law of China which was initially promulgated in 1993.10 Whereby, under Article 1 of the Company 
Law, the main emphasis is focused on the flourishment of the socialist economic system with law demonstrating 
“Chinese characteristics.” Besides the organization of the company, further concentration has centered on the idea 
of protecting the rights of all other entities related to the company.11 By looking at the essence of the socialist 
system, it appears that the introduction of a voting trust system/agreement would provide a positive outcome for 
the whole of China.  
The Chinese characteristics referenced in Article 1 are based in strictly Eastern values untouched by Western 
legal tradition – that of ancient history, Confucianism, and the importance of administrative authority.12 As part of 
China’s socialist past and present, the legal doctrine of China is that “legal rules represent the will of the people.”13 
Furthermore, the law in China has an aim of creating a harmonious society with an eye towards coordinated and 
sustainable development.14 Therefore, the law must comport with the “Chinese characteristics” of their socialist 
law system, or better put “a civil law system governed by socialist ideology with Confucian ethos representing 
Chinese tradition.”15 A law allowing for voting trusts or the adoption of a standard voting trust agreement does 
just that. As discussed throughout this paper, voting trusts preserve minority shareholder rights and prevent 
 
1 See ibid (citing Davis & Thompson, 1994; Kahan & Rock, 2010).  
2 See Marco Becht, Julian Franks, Colin Mayer, Stefano Rossi, “Returns to Shareholder Activism Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes 
U.K. Focus Fund” (2007) available at https://www.academia.edu/people/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=shareholder+activism+disadvantage. 
3 See Janet H. Marler, Christophe Faugère, “Shareholder Activism and Middle Management Equity Incentives”, Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 2010, 18(4): 313–328 (citing Ryan & Schneider, 2002; Parrino et al., 2003). 
4 See ibid. 
5  See Donald Nordberg, “Some Are More Equal: The Politics of Shareholder Activism” (2009) available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1150130.  
6 See supra n.2. 
7 See ibid. 
8 See Gerald R. Thompson, Chapter 3: The Characteristics of Law, Legal Foundations: The Framework of Law, LONANG INSTITUTE (2010) 
available at https://lonang.com/commentaries/foundation/framework-of-law/text/the-characteristics-of-law/. 
9 See Dr. Zhao Ying, “A Brief Guide to The Legal System of China”, DAILY FT (June 21, 2018) available at http://www.ft.lk/columns/A-brief-
guide-to-the-legal-system-of-China/4-657550. 
10 See https://www.jus.uio.no/lm/china.company.law.1993/. 
11 See ibid.  
12 See Ignazio Castellucci, “Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics,” Annual Survey of Int’l & Comp. L.: Vol. 13, Iss. 1, Article 4, p. 38 
(2007), available at http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol13/iss1/4. 
13 Ibid at 46. 
14 See Mo Zhang, “The Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics: China’s Discourse for the Rule of Law and Bitter Experience”, 
24.1 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L. J. 1, 44 (2010).  
15 Ibid at 48. 
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shareholder activism, thus, protecting individuals – or the will of the people – and promoting harmony within the 
corporate sector.1 Moreover, voting trusts have proven their worth in several different countries in the past and 
there is no proof that this system has ever interfered with the actual characteristics of any law of the respective 
countries.2 However, what it has done is it has provided assistance to the already existing system. Therefore, its 
adoption could be helpful in achieving the goals for shareholders set by the Company Law of China. Under Article 
4, of company Law it is provided that, shareholders shall enjoy all privileges – such as huge profits earned through 
capital transactions – and shall also be authorized to take part in making important decisions in the company – 
such as electing managers – and he/she shall also be allowed to enjoy other rights which the law provides in 
accordance with the provisions of the Company Law.3 A voting trust system creates a pathway for all shareholders 
to meaningfully participate in the governance of a corporation and therefore provides an avenue of fulfillment 
under Article 4. 
 
2.1. Voting trust an ideal mechanism for increasing the minority shareholders confidence in corporations. 
The voting trust system is a productive way of increasing the confidence of minority shareholders in the 
corporation. Minority shareholders can use this device to keep a check and balance on the management whenever 
they feel that the management is going down a path that only benefits themselves (or some pressuring majority 
shareholder).4 Under such circumstances, if the same is left unchecked, then the actions of management could have 
a severe impact on minority shareholder interest. 5   However, minority shareholders can use a voting trust 
agreement to extract other minority voters from the market through which they can prevent the assembly of an 
insurmountable pack of majority shareholder and keep an eye/maintain a modicum of control over corporate 
management.6 Hence, for that very reason, courts have upheld the need of voting trust agreements for protection 
of minority shareholders by permitting unification of their voting power into one.7 Specifically, in closely held 
corporations voting trusts are important as they provide  – and sometimes the only –  platform  for minority 
shareholders to be heard by corporate management.8 Many scholars, such as Lucian Bebchuk – professor at 
Harvard Law School – , suggest that increasing the control of minority shareholders in making important corporate 
decisions will assist the entire corporation in countering management agency issues and it, thereby, naturally 
increases shareholder value.9 However, for turning this theory into a possibility, there is only one way to go which 
is establishing a voting trust system in China.10  
 
2.2. Important Platforms for Shareholders protection in China 
In today’s modern world much attention is being paid towards the subject of securing the interest of minority 
shareholders.11The recent developments in the Chinese corporate sector demonstrate the same story as in today’s 
China much attention is being paid to this subject. The Supreme People’s Court has recently issued several 
provisions for  the protection  of minority shareholders  through which they could prevent themselves from 
numerous unwarranted actions committed by majority shareholders.12 The Supreme People’s Court has pointed 
out five different areas where  action is required to be taken so that minority shareholders could be protected from 
 
1  See Milton M. Bergerman, “Voting Trust and Non-Voting Stock” YALE L. J. 445, 454 available at 
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=3268&context=ylj. 
2 See Carl Martin Ross, supra n.10.  
3  See Company Law of the People's Republic of China (2018 Revision) available at 
http://www.ghiplegal.com/static/frontend/img/pdf/company_law_en.pdf. 
4 See Gary D. Burger, “The Voting Trust: California Effects A Barrier To A Rationale Law of A Corporate Control”, STANFORD L. REV. 18(6) 








8 See ibid.  
9 See Zhihong Chang, Bin Ke, Zhifeng Yang, “Minority Shareholders Control Right and The Quality of Corporate Decisions In The Weak 





10  See generally, ibid. 
11 For example, the UK Companies Act provides protection for minority shareholders, as well as laws in other parts of Europe, Japan, and 
India. See Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 (United Kingdom); IOSCO, “Protection of Minority Shareholders in Listed Issuers” (June 
2009) available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD295.pdf; Sections 397 to 409 of the Companies Act of India 1956 
(Companies Act). 
12  See Shan Yuxiao, Denise Jia, “Supreme Court Move to Protect Minority Holders Rights” (2019) available at 
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-04-30/supreme-court-moves-to-protect-minority-holder-rights-101410188.html. 
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acts of aggression. These areas have been identified as follows: (1) Damages inflicted through party-related 
transactions – this kind of situation normally arises when majority shareholders drive the whole corporation 
according to their will and force the corporation to take actions which may not be fruitful for the corporation or 
any of the minority shareholders. This action is also contrary to Article 21 of the Company Law. Likewise, Article 
84 of PRC General Rules for the Civil Law provides that the controlling shareholders or any person holding such 
status shall not be allowed to effect the interest of any legal entity connected to the company by using any party 
related transactions.1 (2) Directors removal without any plausible reason –  if the director has been removed from 
office without plausible ground, he shall be entitled to bring suit to void the removal and he shall be eligible to 
claim such indemnification deemed reasonable by the court.2 (3) Limitation of time for profit distribution to 
shareholders –  according to Article 14 and 15 of Supreme People’s Court 2017 Provisions, the shareholders are 
entitled to receive profits through resolutions accepted at shareholders meetings. If the shareholder feels that his 
due share has not been given to him, then he shall have the right to sue and shall take the matter before a court of 
law and the court shall, after complying with all the legalities, grant relief in favor of shareholder who is so 
aggrieved.3 (4) Dispute settlement issues among shareholders – the Supreme Court’s 5th Interpretation emphasizes 
on the mediation platform whenever there is a dispute between shareholders. Alternative resolution includes 
buying of equity by the company from shareholders, equity transfer by one shareholder to other shareholders, 
shareholders transferring their equity to third parties, reduction of capital by the company, company split, or any 
other way through which the dispute could be resolved so that the dissolution could be prevented.4 (5) The 
application of these provisions –  the judicial interpretation of this provision is of significant importance as it is 
binding upon all the courts of China. Moreover, Article 6 of the provision states that the same could be applied to 
those cases where final judgement is still pending.5   
 
3. Conclusion  
It is obvious that Chinas growth pace is such that no other country has ever witnessed in the past. Therefore, it is 
imperative for the further betterment of its corporate sector that it should include the missing objects for 
corporations to flourish at a steady pace. Hence, the inclusion of a voting trust system could be an important device 
to provide better opportunities for small shareholders which ultimately benefits the entire corporate system of the 
country in general.6 Therefore, if a voting trust system is adopted into the corporate system then it would also assist 
in overcoming extra privilege factors from corporations which normally lay with the majority shareholders. 
Thereby, there will be a balance in the corporate sector. Simultaneously, minority shareholders would be able to 
make a block to prevent corporations from harmful incidents. Thus, such a system could emerge as an ideal 
resolution for Chinese corporate governance as it helps dilemmas that normally incur on all sides in corporations. 
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